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ABSTRACT
Conventional wisdom regards the combination of a staggered board
with a dual-class capital structure as superfluous. However, the incidence of
this combination in U.S. firms, identified in this Paper, is not trivial. This
Paper considers a few possible motivations for this practice and reports the
results of empirical studies conducted on dual-class firms with staggered
boards. Significantly, even in the universe of dual-class capital structures,
effective staggered boards are associated with lower firm value. These
findings suggest that entrenchment may not fully explain the correlation
between lower value and staggered boards in single-class firms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Staggered boards' have been at the forefront of the debate about
corporate governance for the last decade.2 The prolific debate about
staggered boards has long occupied leading academics, top corporate
counsels, institutional investors and corporate boards of large U.S.
companies.3 The persistent focus on staggered boards can be attributed to
the prevalence of staggered boards and their role as an important anti-
takeover device and a powerful management 4 entrenching mechanism. 5
Recently, this focus culminated in a wave of de-staggering of boards.
6
Most prior literature that studied staggered boards excluded all firms
with dual-class capital structures.7 The reason for this exclusion was that
dual-class capital structures provide an effective and powerful anti-takeover
mechanism on their own, so including dual-class firms in studies on the
entrenchment effects of staggered boards would have skewed the studies'
results.8 This exclusion, however, may have caused the literature on anti-
takeover mechanisms to disregard important interactions between dual-
class capital structures and staggered boards. This gap in the literature is
especially problematic because a significant number of firms with dual-
class capital structures also have staggered boards. Since each structure is
widely viewed as an entrenchment mechanism sufficient by itself to prevent
hostile takeovers and proxy fights and to enable the incumbents to prevail
in any challenge to their reign, the non-trivial incidence of the combination
of these two mechanisms is intriguing. The basic puzzle considered by this
Paper is: If we already have a dual-class capital structure, why do we need a
staggered board?
' Staggered boards are also known as classified boards.
2 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887 (2002).
' See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Wachtell Lipton Was Wrong About the Shareholder
Rights Project, HARV. L. SCH. (Apr. 9, 2013),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/04/09/wachtell-lipton-was-wrong-
about-the-shareholder-rights-project/.
4 For ease of exposition, the use of manager and management will generally refer to
officers and directors of a corporation.
' See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Giving Shareholders a Voice, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK, Apr. 19, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/19/giving-
shareholders-a-voice/? r=0_("Staggered boards have long been a key mechanism
for insulating boards of publicly traded firms from shareholders.").
6 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 3 (reporting "a large-scale movement by S&P 500
and Fortune 500 companies toward annual elections.").
7 See, e.g, Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards,
78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 418 (2005); see Mira Ganor, Why do Managers Dismantle
Staggered Boards?, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 149, 165 (2008).
8 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 7, at 14 ("[T]he holding of superior voting rights is
likely to be the key for entrenching incumbents.").
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Understanding what would seem to be a redundant combination of
two of the most potent anti-takeover mechanisms is not only interesting but
also may be especially important at present. Pressure to dismantle staggered
boards has led to a wave of de-staggering among public companies. 9 At the
same time, the use of dual-class capital structures has been non-negligible.'
0
In addition, the use of staggered boards in initial public offerings (IPOs) has
actually increased.' 1
This Paper evaluates several possible explanations for the
combined use of dual-class capital structures and staggered boards. For
example, although a dual-class capital structure can substitute for a
staggered board as a superior anti-takeover mechanism, the interaction
between the two mechanisms can have the socially positive effect of
strengthening the independent directors at the expense of the insiders. A
dual-class capital structure bestows control on a shareholder whose interests
may not be aligned with those of the shareholders as a whole, since the
economic interest of shareholders whose stock enjoys superior voting rights
is misaligned with (that is, disproportional to) their voting power, a
circumstance that may incentivize them to extract large private benefits of
9 Towards Board Declassiflcation in One-Hundred S&P 500 and Fortune 500
Companies: Announcing the SRP's 2012-2013 Results, SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS
PROJECT (Oct. 29, 2013), http://srp.law.harvard.edu/newsletters/10-29-
2013 SRP newsletter.shtml (predicting "declassification of the boards of over
60% of the S&P 500 companies that had classified boards as of the beginning of
2012" by the end of 2014).
o See CII Urges Exchanges to Address Shareowner Rights, BUSINESS WIRE (Oct.
2, 2012, 8:58 AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20121002005978/en/CII-Urges-
Exchanges-Address-Shareowner-Rights-Corporate [hereinafter CII Urges] ("[A]
significant number of start-up companies are opting for the multi-class stock
structure. Twenty of 170 initial public offerings (IPOs) between January 2010 and
March 2012 were by companies with a multi-class, unequal voting stock
structure."); see also Global Governance Program Update, CALPERS.CA.GOV (Aug.
13, 2012), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/board-cal-
agenda/agendas/invest/201208/itemO7b-00.pdf_(raising concern about the
"[i]ncreasing prevalence of dual class voting structures" in IPOs); see also Letter
from Elizabeth Warren,_U.S. Senator, to John Carey, Vice President-Legal,
NYSE Regulation, Inc. & Edward Knight, Executive Vice Pres., NASDAQ OMX
(June 5, 2013),
http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/Senator/20Warren%201etter/20to
%20NYSE,%20Nasdaq%20-%206-5-2013.pdfjhereinafter Letter from Senator
Warren]_("The number of public companies using multi-class stock has risen
sharply in recent years.").
" See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, The Case Against Staggered Boards, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK, Mar. 20, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/the-case-
against-staggered-boards/ ("[Clompanies undertaking initial public offerings .....
are increasingly choosing to go public with staggered boards.").
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control. The staggered board can serve to protect the outside directors from
the wrath of the controlling shareholder who owns the superior class of
stock, and thereby enable the directors to discharge their fiduciary duties in
a way that promotes the interests of the shareholders as a whole. Thus, to
the extent that independent directors are neither seeking the favor of the
controlling shareholder nor influenced by the collegial pressure of the
inside directors, 12 the combined use of the staggered board and the dual-
class capital structure may be shareholder-value-increasing.
Conversely, even though the controlling shareholder's interests
may not always be aligned with the interests of the other shareholders, the
controlling shareholder is nonetheless still a shareholder. Thus, her interests
may be more aligned with those of the other shareholders than with the
interests of a management entrenched by a staggered board and lacking any
significant equity interest in the company. The staggered board may allow
management to shirk and extract private benefits of control even in the
dual-class firm. Hence, the presence of a staggered board in a firm with a
dual-class capital structure may be shareholder-value-decreasing.
Alternatively, with the increased pressure to improve corporate
governance, 13 managers may prefer to have as much protection as possible.
Fearing an overwhelming pressure to relinquish a staggered board or a dual
class may motivate the decision not to choose between the two mechanisms
but rather to install both. With the frequent calls for one-share-one-vote and
12 See, e.g., Melvin Eisenberg, Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law, 13 J.
CORP. L. 997, 1002 (1988) (questioning the independence of disinterested
directors).
13 See, e.g., Ben Protess & Katherine Reynolds Lewis, Once-Reticent Investors Join
Shareholder Revolts, N.Y. TIMEs: DEALBOOK, June 7, 2012,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/07/once-reticent-investors-join-shareholder-
revolts/ ("Emboldened by new regulations - and angered by laggard stock
performance and recent scandals - this new crop of activists is voting down
company policies and backing proposals to reform corporate boards."); see also
David Gelles, Boardrooms Rethink Tactics to Defang Activist Investors, N.Y.
TIMEs: DEALBOOK, Nov. 11, 2013,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/1 1/11 /boardrooms-rethink-tactics-to-defang-
activist-investors/ ("Now, with dozens of activist hedge funds pushing for change
at companies large and small, executives, directors and advisers are scrambling to
calibrate their defenses to this new and in many ways more challenging threat ....
With paranoia at record highs, some companies are going further."); see also
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value,
113 COLUM. L. R-Ev. 1637, 1687 (2013) (showing that "existing (or higher) levels
of board insulation produce long-term costs that exceed their long-term benefits.
Providing shareholders with power and rights that enable them to hold directors
accountable is overall beneficial for companies and their long-term shareholders in
both the short term and the long term.").
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pressure to de-stagger boards, these potent mechanisms, when used
separately, may no longer provide sufficient assurance for the incumbents.
The Paper discusses additional explanations of the combined use of a
staggered board and a dual-class capital structure. Some explanations
hypothesize that such use promotes shareholder welfare, whereas others
hypothesize that it protects the controlling incumbents to the shareholders'
detriment. To understand this phenomenon better, I conducted empirical
studies and tested the opposite forces at play. In addition, since a staggered
board offers undisputable benefits, such as continuity of management, and
since the entrenchment attribute may already be covered by the dual-class
capital structure, the study of the combined use of these mechanisms may
reveal the market sentiments towards these benefits of the staggered board.
Indeed, the empirical study of the dual-class firms found a statistically
significant and economically meaningful correlation between staggered
boards and firm performance, measured by Tobin's Q.' 4 The correlation
was negative.15 This negative correlation is surprisingly similar to the
negative correlation between staggered boards and Tobin's Q reported by
leading studies of staggered boards in single-class firms.' 6 Given that
entrenchment is the prevailing explanation for the reduced firm
performance associated with staggered boards, the presence of a similar
reduction in firm performance in firms with dual-class capital structures is
particularly puzzling because the dual-class capital structure itself is a
strong source of entrenchment. Thus, the empirical findings of this Paper
call into question the strength of the entrenchment explanation.
This Paper proceeds as follows. Part I describes the mechanics of
dual-class capital structures and staggered boards, and considers their
advantages/disadvantages when used independently of each other. Part I1
describes the combined use of these mechanisms, its incidence, and why it
is puzzling in light of current scholarship, such as the seminal work of
Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen.' 7 Part III presents hypotheses that
explain possible motivations for this combined use. Part IV describes the
empirical studies I conducted and their results. A conclusion follows.
14 Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to replacement cost of assets.
See, e.g., Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Q.J.
EcoN. 118, 126-0-7-55 (2003) ("Our valuation measure is Tobin's Q, which has
been used for this purpose in corporate governance studies since the work of
Demsetz and Lehn [1985] and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny [1988]. We follow
Kaplan and Zingales' [1997] method for the computation of Q")..
'5 See, e.g., infra Table II.
16See e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 7, at 18-19.
17 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 7.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE Two FUNDAMENTAL ANTI-TAKEOVER
MECHANISMS
A. The Dual-Class Capital Structure
1. Mechanics
A company with a dual-class capital structure has two classes of shares.
Each class may be assigned different rights.18 Usually, one class has
significantly more votes per share than the other class. 19 A ratio of 1:10-
where one class has ten votes per share and the other class has only one
vote per share-is common. 20 At the same time, the cash-flow rights of
both classes are usually identical.2' Thus, the dual-class capital structure
allows for the separation of ownership and control: 22 The owners of the
superior voting class may control the shareholder vote but own fewer cash-
flow rights than the owners of the other class of shares.
2. Benefits
The dual-class capital structure may serve social welfare as a whole in
certain situations where increasing shareholder welfare may conflict with
increasing the welfare of other stakeholders, such as the general public. An
example of this misalignment of interests can be found in the media
industry, where the twin goals of preserving editorial independence and
18 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (2013) (which allows a corporation to
issue shares with different voting power).
9 See, e.g., Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting
Rights: A Study of Public Corporations with Dual Classes of Common Stock, 14 J.
FiN. ECON. 33, 34 (1985) (studied dual class firms and found that "corporate
officers and their families hold a median 56.9% of the votes and 24.0% of the
common stock cash flows.").
20 See, e.g., American Greetings Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 15 (Feb. 29,
2012),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5133/000119312512194474/d241869dI Ok
.htm ("Our authorized capital stock consists of Class A common shares and Class B
common shares. The economic rights of each class of common shares are identical,
but the voting rights differ. Class A common shares are entitled to one vote per
share and Class B common shares are entitled to ten votes per share.").
21 id
22 See generally, CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, (R. Morck, ed. 2000),
445-60 ("dual class equity structures-produce a separation of control from cash-
flow rights."), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/2000.Bebchuk-
Kraakman-Triantis.Stock.Pyramids.pdf.
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maximizing profits may not always coincide.23 The New York Times
Company, for instance, has a dual-class capital structure with one class of
shares entitled to superior rights, including the right to vote for 7 out of 11
of the company's directors.24 The vast majority of the shares of the superior
class are held by a trust whose declared objective is "to maintain the
editorial independence and the integrity of The New York Times and to
continue it as an independent newspaper, entirely fearless, free of ulterior
influence and unselfishly devoted to the public welfare."
25
Another example for the potential benefit of the dual-class capital
structure can be found in the startup industry. Without the ability to control
the public company, some entrepreneurs may prefer to keep the company
private or at least (inefficiently) delay going public in order to maintain
control. 26  A dual-class capital structure may persuade controlling
shareholders of closely held corporations to raise capital from the public,
because the dual class structure allows the company to exchange cash-flow
rights for capital that may be needed for efficient expansion, without
relinquishing control. 27 Thus, the dual-class capital structure may help small
companies grow and enhance the economy.
23 See, e.g., Felix Salmon, The Financial Times Will Be in Good Hands, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/opinion/the-fmancial-
times-will-be-in-good-hands.html?_r-0.
24 See The New York Times Company: Notice of 2012 Annual Meeting and Proxy
Statement, THE N.Y. TIMES CO., INVITATION TO 2012 ANNUAL MEETING OF
STOCKHOLDERS 7 (Mar. 9, 2012),
http://investors.nytco.com/files/docfinancials/proxy/2012_ProxyStatement.pdf
("The Certificate of Incorporation of the Company provides that Class A
stockholders have the right to elect 30%
of the Board of Directors (or the nearest larger whole number). Accordingly, Class
A stockholders will elect four of the I I directors; Class B stockholders will elect
seven directors.")
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Alexia Tsotsis, Microsoft: "Yeah, We Tried to Acquire Facebook ",
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 9, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/200/12/O 9/fritz-lanman-
microsoft-tried-to-acquire-facebookI (quoting Mr. Zuckerberg telling Microsoft's
CEO: "I don't want to sell the company unless I can keep control.") (maintaining
control of the company may play a major role in the decision not to sell the
company).
27 Even though Facebook raised capital from the public, its controlling shareholder,
Mark Zuckerberg, maintained his control. See, e.g., Dan Bigman, Facebook
Ownership Structure Should Scare Investors More Than Botched 1PO, Forbes
(May 23, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danbigman/2012/05/23/facebook-
ownership-structure-should-scare-investors-more-than-botched-ipo/ ("he owns
about 18% of the company, but controls more than 50% of the voting power").
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3. Disadvantages
Since the dual-class capital structure misaligns ownership and control,
it may have socially undesirable effects. The controlling shareholder of a
dual-class firm may lack the right incentives to maximize the total welfare
of the firm and may prefer to pursue private benefits. News Corp. is another
example of a firm with a dual-class capital structure. 28 The dual-class
capital structure enabled News Corp.'s controlling shareholder and chief
executive officer, Rupert Murdoch, to retain his son, James Murdoch, on
the company's board of directors despite opposition from other
shareholders.29
Generally, studies have found that dual-class capital structures are
associated with long-term underperformance of controlled firms,3 0
underinvestment, and lower sales growth and valuations. 31 Nonetheless, in
recent years, the use of dual-class capital structures has increased.32
B. The Staggered Board
1. Mechanics
The directors of a staggered board are divided into classes. At each
annual meeting, the shareholders vote for just one class of directors.33
Usually, the board is divided into three classes of directors and each class is
elected for a three-year term.34 Thus, winning the shareholder vote in at
28 See NEWS CORP., 2015 Annual Report (Form 10-K) 30 (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://investors.newscorp.com/secfiling.cfin?filinglD=1 193125-15-
288946&CIK=1564708 ("the Company's Restated Certificate of Incorporation and
Amended and Restated By-laws provide for, among other things: a dual class
common equity capital structure.").29 See, e.g., Jeff Green & Arian Levy, Zuckerberg Grip Becomes New Normal in
Silicon Valley, BLOOMBERG (May 6, 2012, 11:01 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-07/zuckerberg-stock-grip-becomes-
new-normal-in-silicon-valley-tech.html_("James Murdoch, the deputy chief
operating officer, would have lost his seat on the board last October at the
company's annual meeting without his father's votes.").
30 See, e.g., IRRC Press Release, New Study Says Multiclass Voting Companies
Underperform, Riskier, IRRC INSTITUTE (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://irrcinstitute.org/news/multiclass-voting-companies-underperform-
riskierpr 10-02-2012.php ("[C]ontrolled companies - particularly those with
multiple classes of shares - generally underperform over the long term.").
31 See, e.g., Paul Gompers, et al., Incentives vs. Control: an Analysis of US. Dual-
Class Companies (Nat. Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 10240, 2004),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w 10240.pdf.
32 See generally supra note 10.
33 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2013).
34 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 893.
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least two annual meetings of the shareholders is required in order to replace
the majority of the board members.35 An "effective staggered board" is a
staggered board that cannot be easily dismantled or circumvented by the
shareholders. 36 For example, if a charter provision establishes the staggered
board, the shareholders cannot de-stagger the board without the approval of
the board itself.
37
2. Benefits
Proponents of staggered boards commonly cite board continuity and
stability as benefits recommending their use. In addition, it is argued that
staggered boards help "attract and retain committed directors., 38 Because
directors who serve on staggered boards are elected for a relatively long
term-usually three years-it is further argued that they can "develop a
deeper knowledge" of the firm and its operating environment and "focus on
long-term strategies. '39 Similarly, it is argued that staggered boards help
outside directors to be independent of the company's officers and thus
reduce agency costs and improve the corporate governance of the
company.4° While these are indeed desirable benefits, Bebchuk, Coates, and
Subramanian pointed out in their important paper on staggered boards that
these benefits can be easily achieved through other instruments such as
policies and bylaws.4' Proponents of staggered boards argue that, when a
firm faces a potential hostile takeover, the staggered board can enable
management to negotiate a better deal for the shareholders and prevent
them from being fooled by a low-ball offer. The failed attempts of hostile
takeovers of the fertilizer manufacturer and distributer CF Industries
Holdings, Inc., and of the industrial gases supplier Airgas Inc., are
anecdotal evidence of this assertion.42 The staggered boards, then in place at
35 Id at 890.
36 Id. at 894 ("If [a staggered board] is installed in the charter, directors may only
be removed for cause, and shareholders may not 'pack the board' by increasing the
number of directors and filling the vacancies created, then we characterize the
[staggered board] as an 'effective staggered board' (ESB)-one that cannot be
dismantled by a hostile bidder without first winning control of the board.").
31 See id at 894 (noting that in all states, repealing a charter based staggered board
requires the approval of both the board and the shareholders); see, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(l)-(2) (2013).
38 Red Hat, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) at 14 (June, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 087423/000119312513254913/d540352d
pre 14a.htm.
39/Id.
40 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 896-900 (summarizing the
"justifications for staggered boards.").
41 Id at 897-98.
42 See GEORGESON, 2012 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 7 (2012),
http://www.georgeson.com/us/resource/Pages/acgr.aspx.
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both firms, helped them fend off hostile takeovers by bidders whose bids
the firms' stock prices later surpassed by a substantial margin.43
3. Disadvantages
The combination of a shareholder-rights plan, commonly known as a
poison pill,44 with an effective staggered board creates an impenetrable
antitakeover mechanism. 45 The poison pill is a mechanism that prevents a
hostile bidder from acquiring a sizeable stake in the company by vastly
diluting the acquirer's equity holdings upon triggering a threshold level of
stock ownership, thus rendering the acquisition economically prohibitive.46
As a result, before the hostile bidder can take over the firm, the board has to
redeem the poison pill, effectively requiring the bidder to gain control of
the board first.4 7 When the board is staggered, however, gaining control of
the board requires successful proxy-fights in at least two annual shareholder
meetings.48 Since a poison pill can be implemented at any time without the
shareholders' approval, a staggered board serves as a powerful
entrenchment mechanism, which secures the manager's job.49
Empirical studies found support to the entrenchment attribute of the
staggered board: a staggered board almost doubles the probability that a
target company will remain independent.50 In addition, studies found that
staggered boards are associated with both lower market values5' and
reduced shareholder returns in successful hostile takeovers.52 Importantly,
studies found support for the view that staggered boards are not merely
associated with lower shareholder value but that staggered boards are, in
fact, causing reduced shareholder value.53 Accordingly, institutional
41 Id.; Liz Hoffman, Investors Press Airgas To Destagger Board, LAw360.COM
(Aug. 7,2013, 3:53 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/463213/investors-press-
airgas-to-destagger-board ("Since the chase ended, Airgas' stock is up nearly 65
percent.").
I See Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 904-05 (for a discussion on poison pills).
45 Id. at 903-04.
46Id at 904.
47 1d. at 905.
48 Id. at 899.
49 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 7, at 412.
50 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 891.
5 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 7, at 412.
52 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 891.
5 See, e.g., Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial
Entrenchment, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 501,501 (2006). After "several econometric
attempts" and "sampling procedures aimed at reducing the likelihood" that the
choice of the structure of the board was driven by performance, Faleye concluded
that "the results presented in this section do not support a self-selection argument.
Rather, they are consistent with classified boards hindering the effectiveness of
corporate governance and hurting the firm's ability to create value for its
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investors generally oppose staggered boards in favor of annual elections of
all board members.
54
III. THE PUZZLE: THE COMBINATION OF A DUAL-CLASS CAPITAL
STRUCTURE WITH A STAGGERED BOARD
Both the dual-class capital structure and the staggered board,
described in the previous Part, are exceptionally powerful anti-takeover
mechanisms. 55 Each mechanism on its own provides the incumbents with
ample protection and entrenchment. 56 And yet, the study reported in this
Paper (the "Study") found that a significant number of firms with a dual-
class capital structure also have a staggered board.
To check the incidence of the combination of a dual-class capital
structure with a staggered board, the Study used The Corporate Library
dataset, which covers the 3,000 U.S. firms included in the S&P Index, the
Fortune Index, and the Russell Index. 57 These firms are the largest U.S.
firms and together represent about 98% of the market.58 In 2011, the most
recent year available in the dataset, the Study identified 299 firms with a
dual-class capital structure. 59 Of these firms, ninety-two (or about 30%) had
also a staggered board.60 About a third of these staggered boards (twenty-
shareholders." Id. at 504, 511; Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 7, at 412 ("[Pjrovide
some suggestive evidence that staggered boards at least partly bring about, and not
merely reflect, a lower firm value."); Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do
Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment,
I 10 J. FIN. ECON. 627, 628 (2013) ("We find evidence consistent with market
participants viewing the antitakeover force of staggered boards as bringing about,
and not merely reflecting, reduced shareholder value.").
54 See, e.g., GEORGESON, supra note 42, at 7 ("[T]he voting policies adopted by a
large majority of institutions is fairly well decided against [staggered boards].").
55 See, e.g., Gompers, et al., supra note 31, at 9 ("[A] dual-class structure is perhaps
the most powerful antitakeover protection possible ....").
56 Id. at 9 ("[F]irms with a dual-class structure may find most other protections to
be superfluous."); Lucian Bebchuk, et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance,
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 797 (2009) ("We excluded firms with a dual class
structure. In these companies the holding of superior voting rights might be
sufficient to provide incumbents with a powerful entrenching mechanism that
renders other entrenching provisions relatively unimportant.").
57 See, e.g., Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a
Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 Va. L. Rev. 935, 986.
58 See Russell 3000 Index, FTSERUSSELL.COM (April 12, 2016),
ftserussell.com/index-securities/index-spotlights/us-equity-indexes (approximately
98% of the investable U.S. equity market are represented in the Russell 3000
index).
9 See Figure 1.
6 See Figure 1.
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nine boards) were effective staggered6 ' boards.62 Thus, about 10% of the
firms with a dual-class capital structure also had an effective staggered
board.
Looking at previous years reveals a similar picture. In 2010, the Study
found 303 [277 incorporated in the U.S.] 63 firms with a dual-class capital
structure.' Of these, 94 [88] had a staggered board, and 27 [27] of these
boards were effective staggered boards.65 These figures have remained
relatively constant over time, as illustrated by Figure I below, which shows
the incidence of firms with both a dual-class capital structure and a
staggered board for the seven-year period starting in 2005. 66
Figure I
Firms with a Dual Class and a
Staggered Board
350
300
250 
- - - __
200 - -- DualClass
El StaggeredBd
150 -l EffectiveStBd
39% 40 37% 35% 34% 31% 31%
100 ~
50 6 ,6 6% 10 8% 9% 10%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
61 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 2 (for the definition and significance of an
effective staggered board as opposed to an ineffective staggered board).
62 See Figure 1.
63 See Figure 1.
64 See Figure I.
65 See Figure I.
66 It should be noted that in 2005 the total sample in the dataset includes only 2,000 firms.
Vol. 10.2
Why Do Dual-Class Firms Have Staggered Boards?
A recent study by the Investors Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)
Institute found that the incidence of staggered boards is about 25% in
controlled companies 67 and almost 44% in companies that are not
controlled.68 The IRRC Institute's study focused on the fact that relatively
fewer companies have a staggered board when the company is controlled-
and attributed it to "classified boards provid[ing] little benefit to insiders at
controlled companies."'69 This Paper, however, focuses on the fact that a
significant number of controlled companies, about one in four, nonetheless
have a staggered board.7 ° If it does not provide a benefit, as the IRRC
suggested, why then does a significant number of controlled companies
choose to have a staggered board?
Similarly, studies of large IPOs of controlled U.S. firms (measured by
deal size) also found a high incidence of staggered boards in these firms. 71
The use of a staggered board in controlled firms seems even more prevalent
in recent large IPOs of U.S. firms. 72 In the two-year period starting with the
third quarter of 201 1, 83% of these firns had a staggered board.73
This relatively high incidence of the combined use of two of the
strongest anti-takeover mechanisms presents an opportunity to learn more
about anti-takeover mechanisms and the motivations behind their
employment. The utility of combining these two potent mechanisms-a
dual class and a staggered board-is not obvious. To the contrary, on its
face, this combination would seem superfluous and redundant.74 In the
67 A controlled company is defined as a company in which "a significant amount of
the vote is controlled by one party through a sizeable ownership stake or,
alternately, through a multiclass capital structure created specifically to allow
voting power to be disproportionate to capital commitment." IRRC INSTITUTE,
CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD & POOR'S 500: A TEN YEAR
PERFORMANCE AND RISK REVIEW 18 (2012), http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL-
Controlled-Company-ISS-Report.pdf.
68 Id. at 13.
69 ld.
70 Id.
71 DAVIS POLK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES OF U.S. INITIAL PUBLIC
OFFERINGS (2011),
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/CapitalMarkets/103111 _CorpGovPractice
s_Booklet _Controlled Included.pdf; DAVIS POLK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRACTICES IN U.S. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS (2014),
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/ControlledCompanySurvey.pdf.
72 Davis Polk reported that 64% of top IPOs of U.S. controlled firms had a
staggered board in the period starting in 2009 through August 2011 and 83% of
similar firms had a staggered board in the following two-year period. POLK (201 1),
supra note 71, at 2; POLK (2014), supra note 71, at 4.
71 POLK (2014), supra note 71.
I" See, e.g., Gompers et al., supra note 31, at 9.
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following Part, I will discuss a few hypotheses that may explain this
surprising phenomenon.
IV. THE HYPOTHESES
This Section now turns to consider the motivation for having a
staggered board even though the capital structure is bifurcated, giving the
controlling shareholder more votes than her capital interest. Possible
explanations range from those positing an increase in total shareholder
value, on one end of the spectrum, to those positing a benefit to the
controlling shareholder, on the other-the notion that combining a
staggered board with a dual-class capital structure could enable the
controlling shareholder to solidify her reign and extract further private
benefits at the expense of the rest of the shareholders and the company as a
whole.75
A. A Staggered Board as a Counterbalancing Mechanism
A staggered board is often criticized as an inefficient tool that
entrenches the incumbent by preventing hostile takeovers and proxy fights,
thus enabling the incumbent to shirk and extract private benefits of control
at the expense of the shareholders.76 As Bebchuk and Cohen showed
empirically in their paper, a staggered board is associated with lower firm
performance and lower shareholder value.77 However, Bebchuk and
Cohen's paper-including their criticism of the staggered board-focused
only on single-class firms.
78
The dual-class capital structure is a strong anti-takeover mechanism
that entrenches the incumbent management, who follows the wishes of the
controlling shareholder.79 The controlling shareholder, who owns the
superior class of shares, has the power to decide the future of the company
and prevent the replacement of the management.80 Thus, in the context of
the dual-class firm, the anti-takeover attribute of the staggered board may
not be relevant, because it is the dual-class capital structure that is
responsible for entrenching the management and preventing a hostile
takeover.
75 See infra Part IV.
76 See generally Bebchuk, & Cohen, supra note 7.
77 d
78 Id. at 418.
79 Id. ("[In] firms with a dual class structure... the holding of superior voting rights
is likely to be the key for entrenching incumbents.").80 Id at 413.
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A company with a dual-class capital structure may enjoy the benefits of
the staggered board without regard to its anti-takeover aspect.8' The
potential benefits of the staggered board to shareholder welfare are
recognized also in the regular, single-class context. However, in that
context, these benefits may be overshadowed by the negative entrenchment
effects of the staggered board. This seems to be the case especially with
effective staggered boards, in which the board structure constitutes a very
strong anti-takeover mechanism.
82
In fact, the staggered board may have a special positive role in the
controlled dual-class firm. A dual-class capital structure may entrench the
incumbent managers and directors, who are supported by the controlling
shareholder (who holds the majority of the votes even without the majority
of the equity), and prevent proxy fights and hostile takeovers. Yet,
independent, outside directors who do not follow the wishes of the
controlling shareholder are not protected by the dual class structure-rather,
they may find themselves exposed to the wrath of the controlling
shareholder. The existence of a staggered board may empower the
independent directors, not just vis-A-vis the insiders, but also the controlling
shareholder. The staggered board may allow the directors to exercise their
fiduciary duties for the benefit of the shareholders as a whole without
facing an imminent threat from the controlling shareholder.83 Thus, in this
special case of combining two entrenchment mechanisms, the two
"wrongs" may ultimately make a "right": a dual-class firm may perform
better with a staggered board and enhance the shareholder welfare.
On the other hand, however, without a staggered board, the controlling
shareholder can override the management: it can, for example, decide
against a takeover promoted by the management or replace the management
over the objections of the incumbents. 4 Yet, if the board is effectively
staggered, even the controlling shareholder cannot force the incumbent to
repeal a poison pill, even if the incumbent was personally elected by the
controlling shareholder, because a director on a staggered board can be
8' But see supra Part 113..2 (discussing the potential benefits of a staggered board).
82 Cf, Guhan Subramanian, Board Silly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/opinion/]4subramanian.html?_r=0. (arguing
that bylaws-based staggered boards should replace effective staggered boards since
the former will allow firms to enjoy the benefits of staggered boards without the
anti-takeover effect).
83 Id.
'4 This is because the majority of the votes of the shareholders, which the
controlling shareholder holds, give the controlling shareholder the power needed
for blocking fundamental transactions, such as blocking a merger. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 25 1(c) (2014).
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removed only for cause. 5 Thus, there seems to be a tradeoff between
vesting control in an agent or in a controlling shareholder who owns a
voting right that is disproportionate to her capital stake in the company. To
be sure, this analysis does not take into account the influence that the
controlling shareholder has even on independent directors.86  The
disinterestedness of independent directors is generally questioned because
of their collegial relationships with the inside directors and because of the
factual challenge of having "no significant relationship of any kind with ...
the subject matter. 87 The clout a controlling shareholder may have with
independent directors by the sheer virtue of her status qua controller may
give rise to further doubt about these directors' actual independence. 8 On
the other hand, the existence of a controlling shareholder may subject the
actions of the directors of a controlled firm to additional scrutiny, 9 thus,
encouraging directors to take additional care ex ante in the exercise of their
fiduciary duties. This theory finds anecdotal support in the notable and
recent case of the failed takeover attempt of Airgas, in which the directors
who were nominated to the target's board by the hostile bidder "were some
of the most vocal opponents to the ...offer," made by the nominating
hostile bidder.90
B. Directors' Tenure and Lower Compensation
A staggered board provides the director with the security of a
(typically) three-year tenure.9' This means that the director need not stand
for reelection annually, but will serve a three-year term before facing the
shareholders' vote.92 In addition, in jurisdictions such as Delaware-the
state in which most U.S. publicly traded companies incorporate--directors
85 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(l) (2014) ("A director on a staggered board
can be removed only for cause, unless the certificate of incorporation provides
otherwise.").86 See, e.g., Melvin Eisenberg, Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law, 13 J.
CORP. L. 997 (1988) (questioning the independence of disinterested directors).
87 Id. at 1002.
88 Id.
'9 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Comm. Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (holding
that the entire fairness standard of review will apply to a merger transaction with a
controlling shareholder even though a special committee approved the transaction).
9 See, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 89 (Del. Ch.
2011) ("[T]he Airgas board unanimously-including the Air Products Nominees-
rejected the seventy-dollar offer. Interestingly, the Air Products Nominees were
some of the most vocal opponents to the seventy-dollar offer.").
9' Red Hat, Inc., 2013 Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 14 (June, 2013).
9 The usual term of a staggered board is three years. Certain jurisdictions allow for
a longer term. See, e.g., BUS. CORP. § 704(a) (2010) (New York allows for a four
year term); see also, N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:6-4 (1) (2013) (directors can serve a
five-year term before standing for reelection in New Jersey).
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serving on a staggered board can be removed only for cause.93 The
requirement that directors can be removed only for cause is limited to
corporations with staggered boards (it does not apply to corporations with
non-staggered boards, whose directors can generally be removed without
cause) 94 and means that mere dissatisfaction with the director's
performance does not jeopardize her three-year tenure.95 Thus, everything
else being equal, a prospective director will prefer to serve on a board that
is staggered.
Even though the controlling shareholder may not need the protection of
the staggered board to entrench herself and make decisions for the dual-
class firm, a staggered board may secure the directors and thus help the firm
attract better director talent. For directors, improved job security may serve
as a tradeoff for higher compensation. An outside director may be willing to
accept a lower compensation than she would for serving on a non-staggered
board, because the lower compensation would be coupled with the promise
of a three-year term.
On the other hand, an effective staggered board confers a significant
degree of control on the outside directors, which allows them to avoid being
ousted (at least for three years) and also may prevent the sale of the
company even if the controlling shareholder is interested in selling it.96
Thus, if the board is structured as an effective staggered board and the
directors gain significant power over the business and affairs of the
company, the directors may also have the power to influence their own
compensation, and may end up with higher pay.
To be sure, the aggregate directors' compensation of publicly traded
firms, as high as it may be, is unlikely to add up to an amount that has a
significant economic effect on such a firm..97 However, the size of the
directors' compensation may influence the behavior of the directors and the
ability of the firm to attract talented directors.98 In addition, it should be
93 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(k)(1) (2014) (subject to a provision to the contrary
in the certificate of incorporation).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 This is because the directors can unilaterally adopt and maintain a poison pill that
will prevent the acquisition of the company without the board's support. See supra
Part 11.B.3.
97 See, e.g., FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., INC., 2012 BOARD OF DIRECTORS
COMPENSATION REPORT (2012),
http://www.fwcook.com/alert-letters/2012_DirectorsCompensationReportNon-
Employee Director-Compensation AcrossIndustries and Size.pdf (reporting
that the median total compensation for board services in large cap companies,
companies with market capitalization greater than $5B, was $229,000).
9' Cf Robert Daines et al., The Good, the Bad, and the Lucky: CEO Pay and Skill
(Univ. of Pa. Inst. for L. and Econ., Res. Paper Series, 2005),
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noted that the motivation and ability of outside directors to significantly
influence the performance of the firm may be constrained even if they are
talented or paid relatively more than their peers, because of the power and
influence of the CEO and a controlling shareholder. 9"
C. Foolproof Entrenchment
Another possible explanation for the combined use of dual-class capital
structures and staggered boards is that incumbents, in search of a lasting
entrenchment, may seek extra assurances. The cases of Facebook, Inc. and
Google, Inc., discussed in this Part, may illustrate the perceived risk of
relying on only one entrenchment mechanism. Similarly, the frequent calls
to enhance corporate governance, de-stagger boards and restrict capital
structures to one-share-one-vote, addressed at the end of this Part, provide
an additional motivation for the incumbents to be unsatisfied with having
only a dual-class or only a staggered board.
1. Facebook's Transition Mechanism-a Staggered Board as a
Bench Player
The case of Facebook, Inc. and its founder and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg,
for example, illustrates the perceived weakness of even the dual-class
capital structure as a foolproof entrenchment mechanism. Facebook has a
dual-class capital structure. 00 Mr. Zuckerberg owns shares of a class that is
assigned superior voting rights-ten times as many votes, in fact, as the
http://papers.ssm.com/so3/papers.cfln?abstract id=622223 (studying the positive
correlation between CEO pay and CEO skill and finding that the CEO equity based
compensation is positively correlated with higher return on assets).
99 See, Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview
of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 655-56 (2005) ("Directors have had and continue
to have various economic incentives to support, or at least go along with,
arrangements that favor the company's top executives. A variety of social and
psychological factors--collegiality, team spirit, a natural desire to avoid conflict
within the board, friendship and loyalty, and cognitive dissonance-exert
additional pull in that direction ... because the CEO has had significant influence
over the nomination process, displeasing the CEO has been likely to hurt one's
chances of being put on the company slate.... CEOs have influence over director
compensation."); but cf. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Embattled CEOS, 88
TEX. L. REV. 987, 987 (2010) (suggesting that there may be a "significant move
away from the imperial CEO who was surrounded by a hand-picked board and
lethargic shareholders.").
"o Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 135 (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954d
s l.htm ("our restated certificate of incorporation provides for a dual class common
stock structure").
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shares of the other class.' 0' Through the use of the dual-class capital
structure and voting agreements, Mr. Zuckerberg controls 57% of the
company's votes.'
2
Facebook's board of directors is not staggered.10 3 The company's
charter, however, includes a provision stating that the board of directors of
the company will convert into a staggered board once Mr. Zuckerberg no
longer controls the majority of the votes1 °4 Thus, despite the dual-class
capital structure of the company, the designers of its charter found it
necessary to build in a mechanism to protect the incumbent should the dual-
class capital structure fail to provide sufficient control. In the case of
Facebook, Inc., the staggered board will serve as an automatic substitute for
the dual class as an anti-takeover mechanism that entrenches the incumbent.
This case shows that a dual class, on its own, may not suffice because
dilution-which may be practically inevitable as a firn grows and must
issue more shares to raise capital105-may cause the controlling shareholder
to lose her firm grip on the company, even though a dual class is considered
one of the strongest entrenchment mechanisms. 0 6 This case also shows that
a staggered board may be used, in the alternative, as part of several
mechanisms such as a dual-class capital structure. 10 7 For Facebook, Mr.
Zuckerberg's loss of control will trigger the restructuring of the board into a
101 Id at 8 ("Shares of Class A common stock are entitled to one vote per share.
Shares of Class B common stock are entitled to ten votes per share.").
102 Ronald Barusch, At Facebook, Governance = Zuckerberg, WALL ST. J.: DEAL J.
(Feb. 1, 2012, 7:49 PM), http:/iblogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/02/01/at-facebook-
govemance-zuckerberg/ ("Zuckerberg only owns about 28% of those super-voting
Class B shares, so where does his control come from? He has voting agreements
with many of his fellow shareholders that give him a proxy to vote enough
additional shares to give him voting rights to a total of around 57% of the super-
voting stock, the SI shows. More than enough to give him control over the
company."); Bigman, supra note 27
("[H]e owns about 18% of the company, but controls more than 50% of the voting
power.").
103 Facebook, Inc., supra note 100, at 135 ("Our board of directors will not initially
be classified.").
104 Id. at 32 ("when the outstanding shares of our Class B common stock represent
less than a majority of the combined voting power of our common stock, our board
of directors will be classified into three classes of directors with staggered three-
year terms and directors will only be able to be removed from office for cause.").
105 To be sure, the company may raise capital through debt issuances, which does
not dilute the original shareholders' stakes in the company, but debt may be too
expensive and may require excessively restrictive covenants.
106 See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm
Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 87 (2001)
("Dual class stock can make a hostile acquisition impossible.").
107 See CII Urges, supra note 10.
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staggered board.108 In the case of the combined use of a dual class and a
staggered board, however, the staggered board is already employed-
standing by as an entrenchment mechanism should the dual class fail.' 09
When opting for the combined use of the two mechanisms, it may be that
the corporate planner did not consider the novel solution adopted by
Facebook. Alternatively, the corporate planner might have dismissed the
Facebook solution in favor of the combined use, which may appear even
more secure since the board is already staggered. In particular, management
that is anxious about hostile takeovers may favor the immediate formation
of the staggered board, notwithstanding the existence of the dual class, in
the same way that managements adopt poison pills in advance of any
concrete threat of a hostile takeover even though they could delay the
adoption as it does not require shareholder approval." 0 Thus, the reason for
the combined use may not be an added virtue of each mechanism but rather
the search for a long-lasting and secure entrenchment.
2. Google 's Triple-Class Capital Structure
Additional anecdotal evidence illustrating the relative weakness of a
dual-class capital structure not complemented with a staggered board can be
seen in the case of Google, Inc. Google does not have a staggered board;"'
it does, however, have a dual-class capital structure.'12 The two founders of
Google, Mr. Sergey Brin and recent CEO Mr. Larry Page, 1 3 own shares of
the superior class of common stock that together afford them 56% of the
108 Id
109 Id
"10 See Ganor, supra note 7, at 169 n.91 ("The existence of a poison pill indicates
the board that chose to have a pill in place is currently anxious about hostile
takeovers, even though a pill can be implemented at any time without the
shareholders' approval.").
I"' Google, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S- I) 89 (Aug. 18, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504142742/ds I a.htm
#toc59330_1
112 Id at 25 ("Our certificate of incorporation provides for a dual class common
stock structure.").
113 In late 2015, Google announced a corporate reorganization that resulted in a
holding company structure in which the parent company was named Alphabet. See,
e.g., Conor Dougherty, Google to Reorganize as Alphabet to Keep Its Lead as an
Innovator, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2015, at Al,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/technology/google-alphabet-
restructuring.html? r-0 ("Under the new structure, Mr. Page is to run Alphabet
along with Sergey Brin, who co-founded the web search business with him in
1998.").
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voting power of the company despite owning only about 15% of the total
shares.' 14
Knowing that the dual-class capital structure alone may not ensure
continued control by Messrs. Brin and Page, since future issuances of stock
will dilute their voting power, the company is planning an innovative
entrenchment solution. Google, Inc. initiated a triple-class capital structure:
adding a new class of shares-which has no voting rights-to the existing
dual-class capital structure. 11 5 The use of a non-voting third class of shares
when issuing new shares will allow the founders to retain their control of
the company by preventing the dilution of their voting power.16
This case shows that the dual class alone may not suffice to ensure
continued control and thus may lead a controlling shareholder to search for
additional forms of protection. 17 The controlling shareholders at Google
have pursued a triple-class capital structure to achieve the security that the
dual-class capital structure failed to provide in the face of additional stock
issuances. 18 Similarly, the staggered board may be used as the added
protection that safeguards a controlling shareholder who may not be
satisfied with the protection afforded by a dual-class capital structure alone.
3. Shareholder Pressure and Calls for Corporate Governance
Reform
The Facebook and Google examples illustrate how a dual-class capital
structure on its own, as potent as it is, may be insufficient for incumbents
who wish to solidify their control and secure their entrenchment. In addition
to the concern that the dual-class capital structure on its own may not
adequately protect the incumbent, increased shareholder pressure and
heightened public focus on corporate governance may motivate
management to look for more than one entrenchment mechanism."9 An
arsenal of anti-takeover mechanisms may provide the incumbent
management with better entrenchment-better than having just a staggered
board or just a dual class-given public sentiment and pressures
"' See, e.g., Michael Liedtke,_Google settles suit, clears way for stock split,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jun. 17, 2013, 8:55 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/google-
settles-suit-clears-way-stock-split.
115 Id.
6 Id. ("By creating a new class of non-voting shares, Google will be able to keep
rewarding other employees with more stock and financing potential acquisitions of
stock without undermining the voting power of Page and Brin.").
117 Id.
118 Id.
"9 See sources cited supra notes 9-10.
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surrounding these anti-takeover mechanisms. 120 Both the dual-class capital
structure and the staggered board have been under attack.
121
Shareholder rights activists may focus their efforts where they can
achieve the highest returns. Knowing that de-staggering a firm with a dual-
class capital structure will not have a significant effect on the
management's entrenchment, activists may not request a dual-class firm to
de-stagger its board. Activists may perceive that attempting to dismantle
two strong anti-takeover mechanisms is a losing proposition that simply is
not worth the trouble. Thus, having multiple entrenchment mechanisms in
place may not only ensure that if one mechanism is lost the others will
remain in place, but it may also provide such deep entrenchment as to deter
activist efforts to begin with.
122
a) Recurrent Calls for One Share One Vote
In June 2013, Senator Elizabeth Warren appealed to the New York
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ to consider barring initial public offerings
of firms with dual-class capital structures. 123 Senator Warren argued that
equal voting rights-which shareholder-rights activists have championed
with the slogan "one-share-one-vote"124-is a basic right to which public
investors should be entitled.125 Citing the sharp increase in public
companies with dual-class capital structures, Senator Warren stressed the
urgency of her appeal.
126
Senator Warren's appeal came at the heels of similar calls by
organizations such as the Council of Institutional Investors (the CII). 127 The
CI's call was motivated by concern about shareholders being hurt by
capital structures with unequal voting rights.128 These concerns also lead the
120 Id.
121 See, infra Part IV.C.3.
122 Indeed, studying the proxy solicitation firm Georgeson Shareholder's corporate
governance reviews, this Study found no shareholder proposals to de-stagger boards of
companies with dual class capital structures in the three years 2010-2012. There were three
requests to eliminate the dual class capital structure in the same three-year period; yet, none
of these companies had a staggered board. See GEORGESON, 2012 ANNUAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REVIEW (2013); GEORGESON, 2011 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REVIEW (2012); GEORGESON, 2010 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW (2011);
GEORGESON, 2010 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW (2011),
http://www.georgeson.com/us/resource/Pages/acgr.aspx.
123 Letter from Senator Warren,supra note 10.
124 Id
125 Id.
126 ld.
127 CI Urges, supra note 10.
128 Id. ("Concerned about the number of public multi-class stock companies and the resulting
potential for harm to shareowners, the Council of Institutional Investors today urged the
New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq to make new companies that have two or more
classes of common stock with unequal voting rights ineligible for listing.").
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California Public Employees' Retirement System (CaIPERS) to consider
withholding investments in IPOs with unequal voting rights.
129
It may well be unlikely that the U.S. stock exchanges will acquiesce to
calls to bar dual class capital structures given the current competitive nature
of their industry. In fact, historically the New York Stock Exchange only
allowed dual class capital structures because of competitive pressure.
130
Even if the exchanges do not revise their listing rules, though, pressure
from institutional investors may lead to changes in the rules and regulations
governing securities offerings. At the end of the day, however, it is not a
question of what is the likelihood that we will see a reversion to a
mandatory single class capital structure; rather the question is the extent of
the threat of this happening as it is perceived by the managers.
b) Dismantling Staggered Board Wave
In the beginning of 1999, about 60% of S&P 500 companies had a
staggered board.131 Shareholder pressure,132 and recent concentrated efforts
by the Harvard Law School's Shareholder Rights Project'33 have led to a
dramatic decline in the number of large companies with staggered
boards. 134 Today only about 10% of the S&P 500 companies have a
staggered board. 135 Thus, in the presence of a wave to dismantle staggered
129 Eleanor Bloxham, 2013: A Year of Investor Class Warfare?, FORTUNE (Dec. 6,
2012, 6:30 PM), http://fortune.com/2012/12/06/2013-a-year-of-investor-class-
warfare/ ("CalPERS plans to take a close look at whether to set prohibitions for
IPOs that have unequal shareholder voting rights ....").
130 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the
Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 5 (1988) ("The weakening
competitive position of the NYSE in the provision of stock transaction services has
put pressure on the exchange to abandon its single class common rule.").
'"' See, e.g., LUCIEN BEBCHUK ET AL., Toward Board Declassification in 100 S&P
500 and Fortune 500 Companies: Report of the SRP for the 2012 and 2013 Proxy
Seasons 9 (2014), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2400652
("[T]here were 303 S&P 500 companies with classified boards at the beginning of
1999.").
132 See Ganor, supra note 7 (finding an association between shareholder pressure
and companies' decision to dismantle staggered boards).
133See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, New Momentum for Change in Corporate Board
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2013, at BU1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/business/new-momentum-for-change-in-
corporate-board-elections.html (the Harvard Law School's Shareholder Rights
Project, or SRP, is a program that focuses on helping shareholders to dismantle
staggered boards).
14 See, e.g., BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 131, at 9 ("The work of SRP and SRP-
represented investors during 2012 and 2013 has contributed to a substantial
acceleration of the trend towards board declassification.").
135 Id
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boards the entrenchment protection of the staggered board may seem
illusory. Managers may no longer be content with the staggered board as
the sole entrenchment mechanism.
The Facebook and Google examples described in subparts C(I) and
C(2) above, respectively, and the shareholder pressure and calls for
corporate governance reform hypothesis described under this subpart C(3)
consider from a different angle the question of why firms might couple a
dual-class capital structure and a staggered board. 36 Subparts C(I ) and C(2)
challenge the assumption that it is superfluous to have a dual-class capital
structure and a staggered board; they hypothesize that deploying both
mechanisms provides superior protection and that a dual class on its own
may not be enough. 37 Subpart C(3), on the other hand, embraces the
assumption that the dual-class capital structure and the staggered board are
substitutes or functional equivalents for entrenchment purposes, and that the
manager may be sufficiently protected with either-and thus may be
satisfied with either-as long as she can be assured that she will not be
stripped of whichever of the two mechanisms she chooses. 31
D. An Apparent Corporate Governance Improvement
Public calls to improve corporate governance may put pressure on
management to respond and show improvement. Starting with several anti-
takeover mechanisms may leave room for "improvement" without totally
relinquishing control. The combination of mechanisms, each potentially
sufficient on its own, provides a currency for management, which it can use
to show an "improvement" without losing significant control. Doing away
with one of these mechanisms while leaving the other intact may serve as a
kind of bone-throwing to the shareholders. Thus, using both a dual-class
capital structure and a staggered board may help channel shareholder
pressure and divert the shareholders' attention towards one of the
mechanisms-a mechanism that is redundant and which the management
therefore could do without.
The hypothesis described in subpart C(3) above focuses on public
discontent with anti-takeover mechanisms and assumes that the combined
use of dual-class capital structures and staggered boards stems from the
management's fear of being forced to give up one of these anti-takeover
defenses. 39 Thus, the motivation behind the combined use is to make sure
that another mechanism is in place to protect management and ensure its
continued entrenchment. 40 The hypothesis discussed under this subpart D
'
36 See supra Part IV.C.
137 Id
138 See supra notes 103-21 and accompanying text.
'
39 See supra Part IV.C.3.
140 See id.
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also focuses on public pressure, yet it assumes that shareholder pressure is
not strong enough to force management to give up its entrenchment, and
thus that it is not merely the fear of insufficient protection that motivates
management. Rather, it is the opportunity to take advantage of the public
sentiment and appear to be attentive to the public without weakening
management security. This hypothesis contemplates a mechanism that
enables management to gain from having both a dual class and a staggered
board-and gain not just from the additional layer of antitakeover
protection, but also from the apparent improvement of the corporate
governance. When management strategically dismantles one of these two
anti-takeover mechanisms, it hopes to score points with the shareholders.
The recent case of Whole Foods Market, Inc. (WholeFoods) may
provide anecdotal evidence of companies ostensibly engaging in behavior
that may be viewed as strategic-attempting to create the mere appearance
of corporate governance improvement. WholeFoods was asked by a
shareholder to include a shareholder proposal in its proxy material that
would give large long-term shareholders proxy access. 41 Proxy access
allows shareholders to list nominees for directorship positions on the
company's ballots, which effectively challenges incumbent directors. 42 The
shareholder proposal allowed shareholders holding at least 3% of the
company's shares for no less than three years proxy access.' 43 Instead,
Wholefoods attempted to circumvent the proposal by asking the Securities
and Exchange Commission to exclude it.' 44 The grounds for exclusion were
WholeFoods' own proposal that would similarly allow shareholder proxy
access, however only a shareholder holding at least 5% of the company for
five years would be eligible. 45 The higher percentage requirement would
have rendered the shareholders' right to nominate directors virtually
inaccessible, while WholeFoods would have appeared to allow shareholder
proxy access.
46
141 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, In Whole Foods Backlash, a Chance to Air Out
Stagnant Boardrooms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2015, at BU I,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/business/in-whole-foods-backlash-a-chance-
to-air-out-stagnant-boardroom s.htm I.
142 See, e.g., Proxy Access, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,
http://www.cii.org/proxy access (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
143 See Morgenson, supra note 141.
144 Id.
145 Id
146 See, e.g., Paul Hodgson, At Whole Foods, Chipotle, and Others, Shareholders
Prepare for Battle, FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/02/03/whole-
foods-chipotle-proxy-access/ ("It's almost impossible, certainly unlikely, for a
single shareholder to own 5% of any Fortune 500 company; 5% of Whole Foods is
about $1 billion. The proposal was a clear spoiler, and was not intended to provide
proxy access at all."); Morgenson, supra note 141 ("[S]ome investors viewed the
proposal as a cynical attempt by Whole Foods to appear to give shareholders a say
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To be sure, as in the case of WholeFoods, investors may see an
apparent corporate governance improvement for what it is. And an efficient
market will realize that management's disposing of only one strong anti-
takeover mechanism while leaving another in place is not sufficient in
terms of corporate governance reform. Yet, it may be viewed as the
beginning of a process-a step in the right direction-and it may at the very
least buy the manager precious time (in which she could continue to extract
large private benefits from the company), since it is likely to take longer to
dismantle both mechanisms. In any case, this hypothesis envisions the
combination of dual-class capital structures and staggered boards as
benefitting the incumbent by leaving at least one protection in place-if
only for the time being.
V. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
The preceding Part offered a few explanations for the seemingly
superfluous use of both a dual-class capital structure and a staggered board.
When considering the effect of this twofold protection on firm value, the
explanations seem to exert forces in different directions: in favor of the
controlling shareholder at the expense of the shareholders on the one hand,
and in favor of the shareholders at the expense of the controlling
shareholder on the other. This Part will examine these competing forces by
empirically testing the effect of staggered boards on dual-class firms.
A. Firm Value and Firm Performance
In order to examine the incremental effect of a staggered board on a
company, the Study started out by comparing the average firm value and
firm performance of two subsets: (a) firms with both a dual class and a
staggered board; and (b) firms with a dual class but without a staggered
board.'47 The hypothesis tested is that in the case of the dual-class firm, the
firm's value and performance is higher when the board is staggered because
the staggered board curbs the powers of the controlling shareholder, allows
the firm to hire better directors, and imparts continuity and stability to the
board. The opposite hypothesis, tested simultaneously, conjectures that the
value and performance of dual-class firms with staggered boards is lower
despite the apparent benefits of having multiple classes of directors,
because the negative aspects of the staggered board are overwhelming even
in board elections while ensuring that they wouldn't, through the use of a high
hurdle.").
"' WRDS, https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
WRDS was used to access the Corporate Library datasets and the Standard and
Poor's Institutional Market Services (Compustat) Database); see Getting Started in
Economics Research, http://guides.library.harvard.edu/economics/wrds (last
updated Dec. 8, 2015) (for a description of the datasets).
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with a dual-class capital structure. Yet a third possibility is that the
combined use of the two entrenching mechanisms, a staggered board and a
dual-class capital structure, is superfluous (potentially driven by legal
boilerplates) and thus the value and performance of firms in the two subsets
is not significantly different.'48
Put differently, this test asks whether the market rewards or penalizes
companies for the combined use of a dual class and a staggered board (or is
indifferent to it). Is firm performance negatively affected by the staggered
board also in the context of the dual-class firm? To answer this question,
the Study examined Tobin's Q, a widely used proxy for firm value and firm
performance, 149 in a sample of U.S. firms with dual-class capital
structures, 150 which included firms with and without a staggered board in
2010 and 2011. The final 2010-2011 sample consists of 332
observations.'15
This study follows Bebchuk and Cohen's study of staggered boards.'52
Bebchuk and Cohen's study included only firms with a single-class.' 53
Bebchuk and Cohen found a negative coefficient of about -0.2 and
suggested that a staggered board decreases the firm's value in non-dual-
class firms. 54 Replicating parts of the study on a sample of only dual-class
firms may enhance the scope of the understanding of the staggered board
and its efficacy.
Specifically, using the Corporate Library datasets and the Compustat
Database, the Study collected financial data about active non-financial
companies 155 with a dual-capital structure that were incorporated in the
United States.' 56 The Study calculated each firm's Tobin's Q and set it as
the dependent variable in the study. 57 The explanatory variable of this
148 See generally John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses:
Blame the Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1301 (2001) (explaining variation in
defenses by characteristics of the advising lawyers).
'41 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 7, at 419.
150 WRDS, supra note 147.
'1' See infra Table II.
152 See generally, Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 7.
153/d.
'54 Id at 18-9.
"I Financial companies are subject to different regulations. See, e.g., Bebchuk &
Cohen, supra note 7, at 418 (excluding REITs from the sample because such
corporations "have their own special governance structure and entrenching
devices"); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN.
EcON. 525, 530 (2001) (omitting financial firms from the tested sample because the
special federal regulations may influence the corporate governance of such firms).
156 WRDS, supra note 148.
15' Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to replacement cost of assets.
See Steven Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities
Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?, Q.J. ECON. 112, 169-216
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study is a dummy variable158 that indicates whether or not the firm has an
effective staggered board. 59 The Study looked for a linear relation between
the log 60 of the Tobin's Q (Log(Tobin'sQ)) and an effective staggered
board dummy variable (EffectiveStaggeredBoard), controlling for various
firm characteristics and assuming the following relation: 16'
Log(Tobin 'sQ) = a + 831 (EffectiveStaggeredBoard) + f12 Log(Size) + 83
(Industry) + (other variables).
B. Control Variables and Robustness Checks
The study's empirical results are robust and are not weakened by the
inclusion of additional controls for variables that might affect a
corporation's performance. The correlation between the effective staggered
board structure and the performance of the firm is significant in the multi-
variable regressions that take into account these additional effects.162
Some variables may affect both the Tobin's Q of the firm (the
dependent variable) and the structure of the board (the explanatory
variable). Thus, including these variables as controls in a multi-variable
regression helps isolate the direct connection between the explanatory
variable and the dependent variable. For example, certain industries may
perform better than the market at particular times and may also follow a
norm of structuring the board in a certain way (with or without a staggered
board.) Thus, checking the correlation between the performance of the firm
and the structure of the board without controlling for the industry in which
the firm operates will provide a biased result that will include the industry
(1997); Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Q.J. ECON.
118, 107-55 (2003); Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1775, 1775-821 (2002);
Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 7, at 409-33. 1 measure Tobin's Q as the ratio of(1)
the sum of the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock minus
the sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes, and (2)
the book value of assets. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 800.
... A dummy variable is a binary variable that takes the values of 0 or 1, and
indicates to which of two categories the observation is classified. See, e.g., William
Gould, Creating Dummy Variables, STATA, (Mar. 1997),
http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/data-management/creating-dummy-variables/.
159 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 894.
16o The logarithm function is used throughout because when we look at the log of
monetary values the effect of inflation becomes an additive constant once the log is
taken: log[X(l+i)] = log(X) + log (1+i), where Xis the monetary value and i is the
inflation rate. In addition, the log transformation is used to prevent bias towards
very large companies.
161 Cf, Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 7, at 17 (studying the association between
staggered boards and firm value on firms without dual-class).
162 See infra Tables II-VI.
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effects. Thus, as control variables the Study included the total assets of the
firm (as Log(Size)), the firm's market value (as Log(MarketValue)), the
main industry in which the firm operates (based on the Fama-French 12
industry sectors). The Study also added to the regression Log(Size)2 and
Log(MarketValue) 2 to control for nonlinearity in the relationship of
Log(Tobin'sQ) to Log(Size) and Log(MarketValue). 163 Founder firms,
firms whose founder serves as the CEO or chairman of the board,' 64 form a
special case of corporate governance and agency relationship, which are
likely to involve different agent motivations. 165 Thus, in the various
regressions ran in this Study, such firms were either excluded from the
sample or this special characteristic was controlled for by including both a
dummy variable for a founder firm and an interaction variable (the founder
firm dummy variable multiplied by the independent dummy variable
EffectiveStaggeredBoard). 66 For example, the regressions of which results
are reported in Table III below include control variables for founder
firms.167
Family firms, firms that are controlled by multiple members of a single
family, 168 may also give rise to special concerns. In particular, concerns
about a few family members defecting from the family consensus and
joining forces with the hostile bidder may weaken the dual-class capital
structure's ability to offer an impenetrable entrenchment defense. Thus, in
the setting of a family firm, coupling the dual class with a staggered board
may enhance management entrenchment. 69 However, a family agreement
may secure the entrenchment of the family and prevent defectors from
circumventing the dual-class capital structure defense even without a
163 See infra Table I.
64 Id.
165 See, e.g., Liedtke, supra note 114 (for the case of Google and its founders,
Messrs. Page and Brin).
166 When we have a sample that includes observations that fall into two categories,
performing a regression on each category separately, and thus allowing for the
constant and the coefficients of each category to be different will reveal the unique
connections within each category. This is mathematically equivalent to adding a
dummy variable together with all its interactions with all the independent variables.
Sometimes, however, this is impractical, because it would reduce the degrees of
freedom excessively, and in such cases one omits the interaction variables. But in
this case, one implicitly assumes that the coefficients do not vary much between
categories. However, it is always preferable to take the first approach if the number
of observations is sufficient. See, e.g., Mira Ganor, Agency Costs In The Era of
Economic Crisis: The Enhanced Connection Between CEO Compensation and
Corporate Cash Holdings, 55 ARIZ. L. REv. 106, 115 n.62 (2013).
167 See infra Table Ill.
168 See infra Table I.
169 Cf, Barzuza, supra note 57, at 982 (proposing that a firm's status as a family
firm may influence the choice to incorporate under Nevada law rather than
Delaware law, because the latter "may be especially costly for family firms.").
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staggered board. 170 Such agreements restrict share transfers and govern the
voting of the family members.' 17 Nonetheless, the Study included a control
variable for family firms in the regression reported in Table VI below.
The Study also included the following corporate governance variables.
A dummy variable that indicates whether or not the majority of the firm's
outstanding shares are held by institutional investors
(InstitutionalMajority); The percentage of shares held by top management,
directors, and 5% or greater shareholders (lnsiderPlusPctg); A dummy
variable indicating whether the firm is incorporated in the state of Delaware
(Delawarelncorporation); and a dummy variable that indicates whether the
firm has a staggered board that is not effective (lneffectiveStaggeredBoard).
A variable that measures the percentage of outside directors by calculating
the percentage of directors of the firm who are fully independent, neither
serve as executives of the firm nor have or have had a significant
relationship with the firm (%DirectorsOutside) was also included. The
percentage of outside directors may play a special role in a sample
consisting of dual class firms. Generally, both the NYSE and NASDAQ
require that the board of directors of listing companies include a majority of
independent directors. 172 However, controlled companies (defined as a
company of which the majority of the voting power is held by an
individual, a group or another company) are exempt from the majority
board independence requirement.1
73
170 See, e.g., The E.W. Scripps Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) at 42 (March
282011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/832428/000095012311029653/141563def
14a.htm. The Scripps family agreement entered among members of the Scripps
family and The E.W. Scripps Company, which requires each member to vote her
shares in accordance with the decision of the family members who hold the
majority of the family's votes and restricts transfer of shares. To prevent
circumventing the agreement, it provides, inter alia, that "[a]ny valid transfer of
Common Voting Shares made by Signatories without compliance with the Scripps
Family Agreement will result in automatic conversion of such shares to Class A
Common Shares" which have limited voting rights and cannot elect the majority of
the board. Id.
171 Id.
172 NYSE Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.04 (2014),
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/sections/lcm-sections/chp_l 4/default.asp;
NASDAQ Inc., Stock Market Listing Rules § 5615-4(c)(2) (2014),
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode
=chp_ 1 4 3 8 16&manual=/o2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F.
173 Id.
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C. Effective Dual-Class Capital Structure
As described in Supra Part I.A., a dual-class capital structure may
provide an impenetrable defense against a hostile takeover. 74 However, not
every dual-class capital structure actually provides entrenchment to the
incumbents. For example, a company may have a dual-class capital
structure that assigns identical or similar rights to the shares of each of the
two classes, pairing control rights with economic interest with no real
deviation from a single-class capital structure. 75 Furthermore, even if the
capital structure of the company assigns disproportionately superior voting
rights to one class than to the other class, the dual-class capital structure
may still fail to secure the incumbent. A dual-class capital structure may
serve as a strong entrenchment mechanism only if the incumbents have the
right to cast enough votes to control the company. For example, if the
superior class has ten times more votes per share than the other, inferior,
class but there are more than ten times as many shares of the inferior class
then, as a group, the inferior class controls the majority of the votes of the
company. Suppose there are two classes of shares: Class A and Class B.
Class A shares have 10 votes per share while Class B shares have I vote per
share. If there are only 10 shares of Class A and 101 shares of Class B, then
Class A has a total of 100 votes (10 shares times 10 votes), while Class B
has a total of 101 votes (101 shares times 1 vote). Thus, even with a dual-
class capital structure there has to be a shareholder who owns a sufficient
number of shares that gives her enough votes to defeat a hostile takeover
attempt. In addition, the structure of dual-class firms may vary not just with
respect to the number of votes assigned to each class of shares for voting on
shareholder resolutions but also in the assignment of special class rights to
nominate and elect board members or to veto merger transactions. If, for
example, the company's charter allows a single class to elect the majority
of the directors, regardless of its voting rights with respect to other
shareholder decisions, then this right may well entrench the incumbents. 76
" See supra Part II.A.
'75 See, e.g., THERAVANCE, INC., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 1 (March,
2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 080014/00010474691100223 1/a2202591
zdefl4a.htm ("[T]he Class A Common Stock is entitled to vote with the Common
Stock... The holders of Common Stock and the holders of Class A Common Stock
each have the right to one vote for each share they held as of the record date.").
176 See, e.g., Dillard's Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) I (May, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/28917/000119312509083518/ddefl4a.htm
("[E]ach holder of Class A Common Stock and each holder of Class B Common
Stock shall be entitled to one vote on the matters presented at the meeting for each
share standing in his name except that the holders of Class A Common Stock are
empowered as a class to elect one-third of the Directors and the holders of Class B
Common Stock are empowered as a class to elect two-thirds of the Directors.").
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Thus, in order to check the effect of the staggered board on
companies with dual-class capital structures that provide a meaningful and
strong entrenchment, the companies in the sample need to have an effective
dual-class capital structure, a structure that de facto provides entrenchment
to the management or a controller. For robustness, the dual-class capital
structure of each of the companies in the sample was examined using the
company's proxy statement filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. 177 For example, some dual-class firms have one individual
who controls the entire shareholder voting power while the publicly traded
stock has no voting power. 17' On the other hand, there are firms that use the
dual-class structure only to secure a minimal representation of special
interest groups on the board but not to confer control to any shareholder or
the management, such as the case of United Continental Holdings Inc.
which uses the dual-class structure to allow the labor unions to have
minimal representation on the company's board of directors. 179 Even when
the dual-class structure assigns to the management less than the majority of
the shareholder votes, management may still be fully entrenched due to
other specific arrangements. Such arrangements include a super majority
requirement on business combinations. 180 This requirement stipulates that a
higher percentage than a simple 50% majority (for example, 70%) of the
votes approves the transaction, thus granting a veto right to the holder of
less than the majority of the shares (in this example the holder of only 30%
of the vote).' 8 ' Similarly, management may have less than 50% of the
177 See EDGAI, Company Filings, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2016).
178 See, e.g., EZCORP, Inc., 2011 Annual Report (Form 10-K) 19 (Nov. 23, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/876523/000095012311100270/d84374e 10
vk.htm ("One person beneficially owns all of our voting stock and controls the
outcome of all matters requiring a vote of stockholders[.]").
' See, e.g., United Continental Holdings, Inc., 2014 Proxy Statement (Schedule
14A) 16-17 (April, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100517/000104746914004198/a2219797z
defl4a.htm (the dual-class structure allows the mechanics union and pilots union to
elect one director each out of a total of 13 directors).
08 See Lucian Bebchuk, et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance, 22 REV.
FIN. STUD. 783 (2009),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=593423##.
181 These arrangements also include veto rights that require the consent of a class of
stock for certain fundamental transactions even though the class represents less
than the majority of the votes of the company. See, e.g., Sirius XM Radio Inc.,
2011 Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 2, 20 (April, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908937/000095012311034969/y90785def
14a.htm ("[H]olders of our Series B-I Preferred Stock held approximately 40% of
the general voting power. ... [W]e need the consent of the holder of the Series B-1
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nominal shareholder voting rights, but nonetheless, possess the majority of
the voting power because certain shares are excluded from the vote as they
are owned indirectly by the company.
82
The Study defined a subset of the sample that consisted of dual class
companies of which the members of the board, as a group, had the right to
cast at least the majority of the shareholder votes, or the right to nominate
the majority of the board members or veto a merger, or had a controlling
shareholder.183 This threshold of inclusion in the subset sample, which
requires more than 50% of the votes, may well be conservative since the
incumbents who hold the right to cast less than 50% of the votes may still
control the fate of the firm. An incumbent who controls 45% of the votes of
a publicly traded company with a dispersed shareholder base, for example,
may well possess de facto control over the company and be safely
entrenched even though her capital holdings fall short of the 50% threshold.
The Study reran the regression with the subset of only the effective dual
class firms, losing about a third of the original sample. 184 To be sure, with
less statistics the significance of the results declined (though still
statistically significant at more than the 90% level), yet the results came out
similar: an effective staggered board is negatively correlated with the
performance of the company, measured by Tobin's Q, also in the sample
consisting of only effective dual class firms, as is described in Table V
below.
185
D. Results and Analysis
The results of the OLS regressions are listed in tables at the end of this
Article. The tables differ by the various controls that were included, but
they portray a similar picture. In particular, the results of the OLS
regression for 2010-2011 run together as a time series, reported in Table II
below, suggest that: Log(Tobin's Q) = (1.76±0.34) + (-0.09±0.03)
(EffectiveStaggeredBoard) + Controls + (statistical error). 8 6 The Study
finds that an effective staggered board is negatively correlated with the
Preferred Stock for certain actions, including:.., any merger or consolidation, or
any sale of all or substantially all of our assets .. ").
182 See, e.g., The Journal Communications, Inc., 2009 Proxy Statement (Schedule
14A) 13 (March, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1232241/000119312509058589/ddefl4a.h
tm ("The Journal Company is our wholly owned subsidiary. Pursuant to applicable
state law, the shares of class B common stock held by The Journal Company are
not entitled to vote".); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(c) (2013).
183 See infra Table V.
.184 Id
185 id
"I6 See infra Table 11.
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performance of firms with dual-class capital structures. This result, which is
statistically significant at above the 99% level, suggests that if a board of a
firm with a dual-class capital structure has an effective staggered board,
then on average the firm's Tobin's Q will be about 19% lower.
Further support to the findings of this Article and expansion to
previous years can be derived from the application of a few of the reported
findings of a comprehensive study by Olubunmi Faleye to the questions
raised in this Article.18 7 Similarly to Bebchuk and Cohen, 8 8 Faleye studied
staggered boards and found a negative relation with firm value in the seven-
year period starting from 1996 through 2002.189 Faleye tested the sensitivity
of his results with respect to staggered boards using a dozen anti-takeover
defenses as controls.' 90 Relevant to the questions raised in this Article is the
fact that one of the anti-takeover defenses that Faleye used as controls in
these sensitivity tests was the dual-class capital structure. 19' Faleye
concluded from the results of the sensitivity tests that "the negative effect of
classified boards on firm value is not driven by other takeover defenses, ' 192
yet he did not question the management entrenchment explanation for the
staggered board in the presence of a dual-class capital structure.' 93
However, from the results of Faleye's study, reported in table 3 of his
paper, one can learn that in the years 1996-2002 the firm value of dual-class
firms was lower when the board was staggered. 194 The sum of the
coefficients of the staggered board and an interaction variable between a
staggered board and a dual-class capital structure, reported in Faleye's
study, is negative and indicates a 6.64 percentage point decrease in Tobin's
Q (with a standard deviation of 0.028). 9'
Finally, it should be noted that, as with prior studies of staggered
boards in single-class firms, causality cannot be inferred with certainty.1 96
However, this Article's goal is not to prove causality, but rather to enhance
our understanding of staggered boards by shedding light on the special case
of the dual-class firm that deploys a staggered board despite the prominent
entrenchment attribute of the dual-class capital structure.
187 See generally Faleye, supra note 50.
188 See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 7.
'
89 See Faleye, supra note 50, at 502.
'9°Id at 511.
191 Id
192 Id. at 514.
193 See generally id
'9" Id at Table 3: Classified boards, other takeover defenses, and firm value.
195 See Faleye, supra note 50, at 512.
" See generally id; Cohen & Wang, supra note 50.
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VI. CONCLUSION
At the center of the corporate governance of the company is the choice
of anti-takeover mechanisms a company decides to adopt and is associated
with various key aspects of the company such as the company's value,
shareholder pressure, agency costs, managerial entrenchment and tenure.
The choice of whether or not to deploy a staggered board, one of the most
potent anti-takeover mechanisms, is substantial and deserves the
concentrated attention it has been given by academics and practitioners.
The isolation of this choice from its context, however, may be obscuring.
Thus, in order to further the understanding of staggered boards, and more
generally the understanding of the corporate governance choices companies
make, this Paper focuses on a combination of anti-takeover mechanisms
that has been largely dismissed and discarded in previous studies: staggered
boards and dual class capital structures.
The existence of this combination is, in itself, revealing: even though
each one of these mechanisms is commonly believed to entrench
management effectively, a number of companies, nonetheless, chose to
deploy both mechanisms.'97 The results of the empirical studies reported in
this Paper are even more revealing: the presence of a staggered board along
with a dual class capital structure is associated with lower firm performance
(as measured by Tobin's Q). While this finding does not shine a positive
light on staggered boards, it questions the conventional wisdom that views
the staggered board as a sufficient entrenchment mechanism that secures
management and allows it to shirk and extract private benefits.
19 7 See infra Table I.
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TABLE I: DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSION
MODELS
A list of some of the control variables used in the regressions and their
respective definitions in the applicable databases.
Control Variables Definition
%DirectorsOutside The percentage of directors of the firm who are fully
independent, neither serve as executives of the firm nor have
or have had a significant relationship with the firm.
Delaware A dummy variable indicating whether the company is
Incorporation incorporated under the laws of the state of Delaware.
EffectiveStaggered A dummy variable indicating whether the company has a
Board staggered board that a hostile bidder cannot dismantled
without gaining control of the board.
FamilyFirm A dummy variable indicating whether the company is
controlled by multiple members of a single family.
Founder Firm A dummy variable indicating whether the founder of the
company serves as the CEO or chairman of the board of the
company. 198
IndustrySector # The firm's industry based on the Fama-French 12 industry
sectors.
IndustrySector I Consumer Non-Durables-Food, Tobacco, Textiles,
Apparel, Leather, Toys
IndustrySector 10 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drug
IndustrySector 12 Other-Mines, Constr, BIdMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv,
Entertainment
IndustrySector 2 Consumer Durables-Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household
Appliances
IndustrySector 3 Manufacturing-Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Off Fum,
Paper, Com Printing
IndustrySector 4 Energy--Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products
IndustrySector 5 Chemicals and Allied Products
IndustrySector 6 Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment
IndustrySector 7 Telephone and Television Transmission
IndustrySector 9 Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair
Shops)
IneffectiveStaggere A dummy variable indicating whether the company has a
dBoard staggered board that does not amount to an effective
198 See Kenneth R. French, Data Library,
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data-library.htmI (last
visited Apr. 12, 2016).
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staggered board.
InsidersPlusPctgSh The percentage of shares held by top management, directors,
ares and 5% or greater shareholders.
InstitutionalMajorit A dummy variable that indicates whether the majority of the
y firm's outstanding shares are held by institutional investors.
MarketValue Market value (MKVALT)
Size Total Asset
Tobin'sQ Tobin's Q, the market value of assets to replacement cost of
assets, the ratio of(1) the sum of the book value of assets
plus the market value of common stock minus the sum of
book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred
taxes, and (2) the book value of the assets.
Year Indicates the year of the observation. YEAR=I refers to data
from 2011 while YEAR=0 refers to data from 2010.
TABLE II - FIRM VALUE AND EFFECTIVE STAGGERED BOARDS WITH A
DUAL-CLASS CAPITAL STRUCTURE WITH ROBUST CLUSTERING AND
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN YEAR AND INDUSTRY
The dependent variable in the regressions is the log of the firm's
Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to
replacement cost of assets. Size is the value of the total assets of the firm.
[Description of the additional variables is available in Table I above] The
data was taken from Compustat and the Corporate Library databases and
does not include financial firms and founder firms. 199 The Arellano test
(firm, year) was used for the calculation of White's heteroskedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix.200 (t-statistic is reported in parentheses. The
notations "**, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels
respectively.)
Dependent Variable: Log(Tobin'sQ) 2010 -2011
Variable Beta Variable Beta
(t-statistics) (t-statistics)
Intercept 1.75729850 Year 0.00024315
(5.1599)*** (0.0329)
EffectiveStaggeredBoard -0.09171169 Year* Industry 1 0.00908541
(-3.1884 )*** (0.8306)
Industry 1 -0.01641304 Year*Industry 2 0.01737740
(-0.5203) (0.7021)
Industry 2 -0.02873632 Year*Industry 3 0.02858408
(-0.6558) (1.6125)
199 WRDS was used to access the Corporate Library datasets and the Compustat
Database. See sources cited supra note 147.2 00 See Arellano, M., Computing Robust Standard Errors for Within-groups
Estimators, 49 OXFORD BULL. ECON. AND STAT. 431, 431-34 (1987).
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Industry 3 -0.03514412 Year*Industry 4 0.02910354(-0.9695) (1.3078)
Industry 4 -0.00254329 Year* Industry 5 0.01593088
(-0.0633) (0.7819)
Industry 5 0.05074203 Year* Industry 6 -0.03061758
(0.6535) (-1.0581)
Industry 6 (tech) -0.06429337 Year*Industry 7 -0.00811520
(-1.6367) (-0.6306)
Industry 7 0.01729698 Year* Industry 8 -0.01082972
(0.5387) (-0.8446)
Industry 8 -0.03900584 Year*Industry 9 0.01134862
(-1.0420) (1.0272)
Industry 9 -0.01439985 Year*Industry 10 0.00539140
(-0.4211) (0.2177)
Industry 10
-0.01433567
(-0.1924)
LOG(Size) -1.01382925
(-3.9835)***
InsidersPlusPctgShares 0.01758137
(0.5180)
%DirectorsOutside -0.01058924
(-0.1901)
lneffectiveStaggeredBoard 0.00625377
(0.3195)
InstitutionalMajority -0.00401470
(-0.4372)
Log(MarketValue) 0.05647171
(0.3531)
Log(MarketValue)A2 0.05175835
(2.0868)**
LOG(Size)^2 0.09036424
(2.2252)**
Delaware Incorporation 0.03334949(1.6992) *
N 332
TABLE III - ROBUSTNESS TESTS - FIRM VALUE AND EFFECTIVE
STAGGERED BOARDS WITH A DUAL-CLASS CAPITAL STRUCTURE
INCLUDING FOUNDER FIRMS
The dependent variable in the regressions is the log of the firm's
Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to
replacement cost of assets. Size is the value of the total assets of the firm.
[Description of the additional variables is available in Table I above.] The
data was taken from Compustat and the Corporate Library databases and
does not include financial firms. 20' (t-statistic is reported in parentheses.
201 WRDS was used to access the Corporate Library datasets and the Compustat
Database. See sources cited supra note 147.
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The notations , indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels
respectively.)
Dependent Variable: Log (Tobin'sQ) 2010 2011
Variable Beta Beta
(t-statistics) (t-statistics)
Intercept 1.01692 0.88119
(4.67)*** (4.64)***
EffectiveStaggered Board -0.08190 -0.06797
(-2.19)** (-2.06)**
Industry 1 -0.01975 -0.01822
(-0.56) (-0.55)
Industry 2 -0.03634 -0.03984
(-0.55) (-0.68)
Industry 3 -0.01763 -0.01529
(-0.41) (-0.38)
Industry 4 -0.03447 -0.00347
(-0.51) (-0.06)
Industry 5 0.09233 0.04421
(1.37) (0.69)
Industry 6 (tech) 0.04032 -0.07003
(0.93) (-2.05)**
Industry 7 0.04671 0.01685
(1.26) (0.49)
Industry 8 -0.05865 -0.07794
(-0.69) (-1.09)
Industry 9 -0.00930 -0.01149
(-0.24) (-0.34)
Industry 10 0.04515 0.04794
(0.88) (1.01)
LOG(Size) -0.43205 -0.46390
(-3.10)*** (-3.41)***
InsidersPlusPctgShares -0.08856 -0.05108
(-1.73)* (-1.15)
%DirectorsOutside -0.05700 -0.11427
(-0.74) (-1.71)*
IneffectiveStaggeredBoard -0.02456 -0.01535
(-0.95) (-0.64)
InstitutionalMajority -0.05150 -0.00792
(-2.15)** (-0.39)
Log(MarketValue) 0.01970 0.12906
(0.19) (1.21)
Log(MarketValue)A2 0.06078 0.04424
(3.46)*** (2.49)**
LOG(Size)A2 -0.00079 0.00628
(-0.03) (0.28)
Delaware Incorporation 0.03555 0.00414
(1.52) (0.21)
Founder Firm -0.01864 -0.04578
(-0.50) (-1.47)
Founder Firm* EffectiveStaggeredBoard 0.04532 0.18083
(0.48) (1.73)*
N 180 204
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TABLE IV - ROBUSTNESS TESTS - FIRM VALUE AND EFFECTIVE
STAGGERED BOARDS WITH A DUAL- CLASS CAPITAL STRUCTURE -
FOUNDER FIRMS OMITTED
The dependent variable in the regressions is the log of the firm's
Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to
replacement cost of assets. Size is the value of the total assets of the firm.
[Description of the additional variables is available in Table I above.] The
data was taken from Compustat and the Corporate Library databases and
does not include financial firms. (t-statistic is reported in parentheses. The
notations .. , * indicate
respectively.)
significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels
Dependent Variable: 2010 2010 2011 2011
Log(Tobin'sQ)
Variable Beta Beta Beta Beta
t_ t- (t- (t-
Intercept 0.17984 1.04568 0.15933 1.09039
(10.03)*** (4.62)*** (9.68)*** (5.40)***
EffectiveStaggered Board -0.04063 -0.07756 -0.01813 -0.06954(-0.71) (-2.13)** (-0.36) (-2.15)**
Industry 1 -0.02901 -0.02076
(-0.82) (-0.62)
Industry 2 -0.03861 -0.03891
(-0.61) (-0.68)
Industry 3 -0.03358 -0.02568
(-0.81) (-0.62)
Industry 4 -0.03712 -0.01164
(-0.59) (-0.20)
Industry 5 0.04926 0.04682
(0.84) (0.74)
Industry 6 (tech) -0.04091 -0.07311
(-0.88) (-2.01)**
Industry 7 0.01553 -0.00377
(0.45) (-0.11)
Industry 8 -0.07546 -0.09167
(-0.94) (-1.30)
Industry 9 -0.01274 -0.02241
(-0.32) (-0.63)
Industry 10 -0.01423 0.04960
(-0.24) (0.92)
LOG(Size) -0.64110 -0.51160
(-4.66)*** (-3.77)***
InsidersPlusPctgShares -0.11563 -0.04430
(-2.27)** (-0.97)
%DirectorsOutside -0.12853 -0.14464
(-1.64) (-2.08)**
IneffectiveStaggeredBoard -0.04747 -0.01582
(-1.79)* (-0.62)
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InstitutionalMajority -0.04567 -0.01150
(-1.87)* (-0.54)
Log(MarketValue) 0.25902 0.05923
(2.18)** (0.52)
Log(MarketValue)A2 0.02030 0.04996
(1.05) (2.60)**
LOG(Size)A2 0.03558 0.01768
(1.56) (0.78)
Delaware Incorporation 0.02579 0.00611
(1.08) (0.29)
N 175 153 182 179
Adjusted R-squared 0.6631 0.6392
TABLE V - FIRM VALUE AND EFFECTIVE STAGGERED BOARDS WITH
AN EFFECTIVE DUAL-CLASS CAPITAL STRUCTURE WITH ROBUST
CLUSTERING AND INTERACTIONS BETWEEN YEAR AND INDUSTRY
The dependent variable in the regressions is the log of the firm's
Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to
replacement cost of assets. Size is the value of the total assets of the firm.
[Description of the additional variables is available in Table I above.] The
data was taken from Compustat and the Corporate Library databases and
does not include financial firms and founder firms. The Arellano test (firm,
year) was used for the calculation of White's heteroskedasticity-consistent
covariance matrix. (t-statistic is reported in parentheses. The notations
* indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels respectively.)
Dependent Variable: Log(Tobin'sQ) 2010 -2011
Variable Beta Variable Beta
(t-statistics) (t-statistics)
Intercept 1.14686683 Year -0.00010554
(2.3415)** (-0.0104)
EffectiveStaggered Board -0.07831717 Year*Industry 1 0.00064340
(-1.8090 )* (0.0487)
Industry 1 -0.01832896 Year*industry 2 -0.02406881
(-0.4863) (-1.7481)*
Industry 2 -0.04481484 Year*Industry 3 0.01865264
(-1.1624) (1.0295)
Industry 3 -0.04725125 Year*lndustry 5 0.03382091
(-1.2172) (1.2848)
Industry 5 0.06891798 Year*Industry 6 -0.01192020
(0.6646) (-0.3434)
Industry 6 (tech) -0.06296404 Year*industry 7 0.00158810
(-1.1658) _(0.1169)
Industry 7 -0.00125837 Year*Industry 8 -0.01540984
(-0.0346) (-1.4592)
Industry 8 -0.03133138 Year*industry 9 0.01898866
(-0.5814) (1.1924)
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Industry 9 -0.04619909 Year*Industry 10 -0.00823696
1 (-1.1898) -0.1970
Industry 10 0.04126813
10.48011
LOG(Size) -0.62278203
(-1.7102)*
InsidersPlusPctgShares 0.04862705
(1.1431)
%DirectorsOutside -0.05278467
(-0.9814)
IneffectiveStaggeredBoard -0.02996607
(-0.9997)
InstitutionalMajority -0.01033879
(-0.8827)
Log(MarketValue) 0.02322583
(0.1396)
Log(MarketValue)A2 0.05782991
(2.1729)**
LOG(Size)A2 0.03762242
(0.6508)
Delaware Incorporation -0.00405955
(-0.1843)
N 202
TABLE VI - FAMILY FIRM CONTROLS - FIRM VALUE AND EFFECTIVE
STAGGERED BOARDS WITH AN EFFECTIVE DUAL-CLASS CAPITAL
STRUCTURE WITH ROBUST CLUSTERING AND INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
YEAR AND INDUSTRY
The dependent variable in the regressions is the log of the firm's
Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to
replacement cost of assets. Size is the value of the total assets of the firm.
[Description of the additional variables is available in Table I above.] The
data was taken from Compustat and the Corporate Library databases and
does not include financial firms and founder firms. The Arellano test (firm,
year) was used for the calculation of White's heteroskedasticity-consistent
covariance matrix. (t-statistic is reported in parentheses. The notations
indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels respectively.)
Dependent Variable: Log(Tobin'sQ) 2010 -2011
Variable Beta Variable Beta
(t-statistics) (t-statistics)
Intercept 1.0891 Year -0.000076647
(2.3749)** (-0.0075)
EffectiveStaggered Board -0.074941 Year*Industry 1 -0.0016802
(-1.87)* (-0.1255)
Industry 1 -0.004945 Year*Industry 2 -0.024542
(-0.129) (-1.753)*
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Industry 2 -0.034093 Year*lndustry 3 0.0141
(-0.7365) (0.7458)
Industry 3 -0.044256 Year*Industry 5 0.035732
(-1.1483) (1.3936)
Industry 5 0.07306 Year*Industry 6 -0.010937
(0.8371) (-0.316)
Industry 6 (tech) -0.066755 Year*Industry 7 0.0002831
(-1.2653) (0.0209)
Industry 7 0.00066527 Year*Industry 8 -0.015513
(0.0181) (-1.4653)
Industry 8 -0.011387 Year* Industry 9 0.021092
(-0.215) (1.3019)
Industry 9 -0.048697 Year*Industry 10 -0.016908
-1.247) (-0.3803)
Industry 10 0.039652 FamilyFirm -0.050407
(0.4546) (-2.2626)**
LOG(Size) -0.58554
(-1.7162)*
InsidersPlusPctgShares 0.08454
(1.964)*
%DirectorsOutside -0.046767
(-0.8924)
IneffectiveStaggeredBoard -0.036011
(-1.2798)
InstitutionalMajority -0.01143
(-0.9701)
Log(MarketValue) 0.028141
(0.1716)
Log(MarketValue)A2 0.056641
(2.1833)**
LOG(Size)A2 0.032435
(0.5995)
Delaware Incorporation -0.013504
-0.6227)
N 202
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